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Abstract 
This paper examines why it is that Zambia and Zimbabwe, two states with similar 
background conditions and initial positions, arrived at differing policy decisions with regards to 
genetically modified organisms (GMO). The two neighboring Southern African states are 
economically dependent on their agricultural sector, share a common colonial legacy, rely 
heavily on maize as a subsistence crop and have struggled with issues of food security. Their 
decisions were shaped by their post-colonial legacy and differing conceptions of modernity. In 
the years following independence, Zambia sought to subsidize their agricultural sector through 
inputs and credit. Zimbabwe instead focused on land reform and reapportionment, and in so 
doing hampered their agricultural sector enough to necessitate GMO acceptance. An 
understanding of the motivations for rejection of GMO in Southern Africa has implications for 
future food relief programs within Africa and elsewhere.  
Keywords: Zambia, Zimbabwe, GMO, genetically modified organisms, transgenic crops 
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I. Introduction 
 
The aim of this paper is to examine why it is that Zambia and Zimbabwe, two states with 
similar background conditions and initial positions, arrived at differing policy decisions with 
regards to genetically modified organisms (GMO). The two neighboring Southern African states 
are economically dependent on their agricultural sector, share a common colonial legacy, rely 
heavily on maize as a subsistence crop and have struggled with issues of food security. An 
understanding of the motivations for rejection of GMO in Southern Africa has implications for 
future food relief programs within Africa and elsewhere.  
In mid-2002, in the midst of a famine that struck all of Southern Africa, Zambia, 
Zimbabwe, Mozambique and Malawi refused acceptance of thousands of tons of donated grain, 
and Zambia returned more than 15,000 tons of donated maize already in the country back to the 
World Food Program (WFP). This seemingly unwise decision only makes sense in the context of 
the genetically modified organism debate, in which Southern Africa is currently embroiled. At 
the time, the four rejecting states cited concerns over the release of GMO crops in the 
environment and in the food supply. Opponents of GMO pointed to this as a clear case of the 
United States, through the WFP, attempting to take advantage of a food crisis to promote GMO 
crops in the region (Zerbe, 2004). While this may be the case, why the four states rejected the 
crops remains an open question. 
The case was further muddied when Malawi, Mozambique and Zimbabwe shifted 
positions and permitted the importation of GMO grains and maize – as long as the material was 
milled outside of their borders. Ostensibly this condition was to ensure that any seeds in the 
material would be destroyed prior to the crops entering the country (Karimjee, 2011), thus 
preventing farmers receiving food aid from planting the seeds. This seems to indicate that the 
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chief concern of these three states was not in fact the safety of GMO crops in the food supply, 
but one involving the release of GMO strains in to the environment. In the midst of famine and 
widespread starvation, it would seem implausible that an environmentalist concern would carry 
so much sway as to actually lead to the rejection of much-needed food. This assertion is backed 
up by a body of literature that revolves around the idea that developing states, and in this case 
specifically the Southern African states, fear being viewed as “contaminated” by GMO strains. 
This mark of contamination might lead to their permanently losing markets where the future of 
GMO is uncertain, such as the European Union (Aerni & Bernauer, 2006; Paarlberg, 2003). This 
argument seems to explain why four states on the brink of disaster would risk further harm in 
order to insure no GMO seeds were sown in their soil, but simultaneously accept food stuffs 
made from these same GMO crops. 
The interesting question arises when one introduces the anomalous case of the sole 
holdout, Zambia. Zambia had been the first state in the region to raise concerns regarding the 
safety of GMO crops, and had spurred its Southern African neighbors to insist on GMO-free 
food aid. The vast majority of the rejected grain had been grown in the United States, the world 
leader in total GMO crop hectares. Initial requests by the Southern African states that the grain 
be milled prior to exportation were rejected by the US, citing unreasonably high costs (Zerbe, 
2004). When South Africa stepped in and offered to mill the grain prior to its importation in to 
the famine-stricken states, Mozambique, Malawi and Zanzibar accepted those terms. Zambia, 
however, continued to reject GMO grain, milled or unmilled. After sending a team of scientists 
to the United States and the European Union in order to study the potential effects of GMO food 
(Zerbe, 2004), Zambian officials cited the “precautionary principle” as necessitating rejection 
(BBC News, 2002). The use of the precautionary principle is interesting as, while the term is 
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rooted in the German principle of vorsorgeprinzip, the precautionary principle was explicitly 
cited just two years prior by the European Union, in the Lisbon Treaty, as being instructive when 
considering the potential impact of polluters on the environment.  
The decision process that goes into state-wide acceptance or rejection of biotechnology 
generally, and GMO specifically, is important when viewed from either the perspective of the 
developing state or those attempting to export the technology. Understanding the concerns that 
motivate a government to reject GMO, even when facing food shortages and famine, could go a 
long way towards steering future programs in a more successful direction. Getting safe, higher 
yield crops planted in regions that are facing food shortages seems like a win for all involved, but 
it is unlikely that future programs would be able to allay the fears of the developing states if there 
isn’t an accurate picture of their chief concerns. A comparative examination of states where 
GMO has been accepted, and those where GMO has been rejected, could be instructive in 
teasing out some of the details of the decision process. Such a comparison would need to control 
for as many other variables as possible, and thus states with similar reliance on agricultural 
production and being regionally bound, would be ideal.  
 This paper will proceed by examining the current literature surrounding the topic of the 
acceptance and rejection of GMO food in Southern Africa. Each fails to fully account for the 
motivations behind the Zambian rejection, and posits an overly simplified causal relationship 
between a single factor and rejection. The “Knowledge Gap” school of thought asserts that the 
Zambian rejection stems from a fundamental lack of knowledge about the technology; likewise, 
the “Market Preservation” literature posits that rejection is purely an attempt by Southern 
African states to ensure access to the European Union, where GMO’s future remains uncertain. 
Still more literature revolves around the Zambian adoption of “The Precautionary Principle”, that 
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is the idea that, in situations where environmental impact of a new technology is not certain, a 
conservative position should be taken; this literature fails to address the question of what makes 
these Southern African states believe the impact of GMO is uncertain, however. Additionally, a 
school of thought revolves around the idea that rejection is motivated chiefly by food sovereignty 
and intellectual property concerns of small farmers; Southern African small farmers to the point 
of the famine were predominantly locally self-sufficient and, consequently, lacked any 
organization or institution representing their needs to the state. As such, the failure of the 
argument that GMO rejection is fulfilling the will of the small farmer is that, it would seem, no 
one has yet asked him. The school of thought that I found most salient and consequently based 
most of my work on is the “Maize to Modernity” literature. Zambia persisted in rejecting GMO 
maize because cultivating the crop means something to the Zambian state that is not immediately 
apparent to outsiders. The WFP’s program was not a failure of a backwards African state to 
accept the help they needed, or a flat-out rejection of technology, but a failure of the WFP to 
adequately tailor the program to comport with the long term goals and visions of the Zambian 
state for their agricultural program.  
Following my evaluation of these schools of thought, I will seek to answer the chief research 
question of this paper, namely why Zambia and Zimbabwe, despite similarities in their 
background conditions and initial positions, arrived at differing policies regarding GMO. I will 
discuss the experience of the two states, both before and after the famine, in an effort to tease out 
what led to their variation in transgenic food policy. I will follow with a discussion of my 
findings: that the Zambian and Zimbabwean states differed in their commitment to agricultural 
subsidies, such as input credit and output marketing assistance. For Zambia, maize cultivation 
came to symbolize modernity in the years following the fall of their industrial sector. 
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Consequently, the Zambian state had in place a well-organized infrastructure for supporting rural 
farmers with agricultural inputs, whereas Zimbabwe’s similar programs were significantly 
hampered by the ongoing land reform process in that state. In conclusion I will discuss the 
implications of my findings including a discussion of the need for tailored programs, such as the 
World Food Program’s famine assistance. An understanding of how technology policies in 
developing countries actually evolve over time, rather than a reliance on assumptions of 
“backwardness” or simple cause and effect narratives, is necessary if these programs are to ever 
meet with success. 
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II. Southern African GMO Rejection: A Review of the Literature 
 
An examination of the literature surrounding the rejection of GMO in Southern African 
states reveals a few broad schools of thought none of which, taken alone, provide an answer to 
the research question undertaken in this paper. The first, consisting of the market preservation 
literature, find the uncertain future of GMO acceptance in the European Union to be instructive 
when searching for causes of GMO rejection in Southern Africa. The second, built on early work 
examining the reason for GMO rejection in the European Union, finds a gap in knowledge on the 
part of the public to be a key mechanism in rejecting states. The third examines the role of the 
“precautionary principle” in predicting GMO rejection, while the fourth examines the role of 
environmental NGOs and advocacy groups purporting to act on behalf of small farmers. The 
fifth, and most salient, is instructive in explaining the persistence of GMO rejection in Zambia: 
maize production has come to symbolize Zambian modernity, but chiefly through a focus on 
large scale agricultural programs. While small farms may benefit from the introduction of GMO, 
the Zambian government is interested chiefly in supporting large scale agricultural production 
for exportation and domestic use. Zimbabwe was chosen as the comparative case for this paper, 
despite maize not playing a similar “modern-making” role in that state. The two cases are the 
most comparable due to the fact that the research question revolves around GMO; while another 
crop may play a more “modern-making” role in a different state, the GMO debate is most 
relevant and observable in these two neighboring Southern African states.  
Market Preservation 
 
 The market preservation literature is built around the idea that the Southern African states 
are acting chiefly to preserve their export market in the European Union. The idea is that the 
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states are acting in a rationalist manner, weighing the costs and benefits of their GMO policy 
with regards to their future export-based revenues. This body of literature is politically charged, 
with calls for the E.U. to accept GMO to depoliticize the issue (Bodulovic, 2005) or the United 
States to step in to promote biotechnology in Africa (Paarlberg, 2003). In the “current scenario, it 
is possible that most southern African nations will not waver in their general opposition to GM 
crops and food until there is a real change in the attitude of the European Union and products of 
agricultural biotechnology become more widely accepted” (Bodulovic, 2005). E.U. rejection of 
GMO is thus framed as being causal for all manner of environmental destruction and 
impoverishment in Southern Africa.   
 The market preservation literature is actually weakened by the work of one of its early 
proponents, Robert Paarlberg. He asserts that, while the European Union has been known to 
reject shipments of crops thought to be contaminated with GMO strains, the complete exclusion 
of imports from a state known to plant GMO varieties is all but unheard of. Even imports of 
GMO-laden maize from the United States were accepted, under the condition that the products 
containing the maize be properly labeled (Paarlberg, 2006). The most damning evidence 
produced by Paarlberg as to the concern of market preservation being the cause of GMO 
rejection, however, is the simple fact that the crops being offered to the Southern African states 
are not those for which there is a significant export market in the recipient states; “By far the 
most frequent export destination for ‘possibly GM’ products from these selected African 
countries was other countries in Africa itself” (Paarlberg, 2006). The percentage of crops for 
which there are GMO varieties and that had historically been exported to GMO-unfriendly states, 
such as the European Union, is very low. Furthermore, there is a body of work in the economics 
literature that suggests the increase in crops for “domestic consumers … is far more than the 
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small gain in terms of greater market access to the EU” (Anderson & Jackson, 2005). Assuming 
perfect knowledge about their markets, it seems unlikely then that the Southern African states 
that reject GMO are doing so to preserve trading markets in Europe.  
Knowledge Gap 
 
 The knowledge gap literature, in large part building on the earlier work of Borlaug 
(2000), argues that the rejection of biotechnology solutions to problems of food production stems 
from a lack of knowledge on the part of the consumers.  Speaking initially of the European 
Union, Borlaug cited the lack of sufficient education on the topic of GMO as causing 
unnecessary fear and a generally misunderstanding of the technology; he further stated, 
“Privileged societies have the luxury of adopting a very low-risk position on the genetically 
modified crop issue ... But the vast majority of humankind … does not have such a luxury” 
(Borlaug, 2000). This notion, that GMO rejection stems from a lack of knowledge of the 
technology, was exported from the EU to the developing world along with the transgenic crops.  
 The knowledge gap hypothesis has also been taken up by the communications literature. 
Authors calling for improved cooperation between journalists, scientists, and governments have 
cited the need for open channels of communication with the public if any progress is to be made 
in increasing GMO acceptance with the general population. In order to alleviate concerns as to 
the safety of GMO, public information programs focusing on “social engagement and improved 
community knowledge” (Mugwagwa & Wamae et al, 2010) have been discussed at length. This 
body of literature takes for granted the safety of GMO, and thus sees the begged question as 
being one asking why the message of GMO-safety is not being conveyed successfully. The 
assumption is that the anti-GMO message is being propagated along community channels, and 
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being rendered more convincing by its messenger, whereas the pro-GMO message is being 
propagated by sources perceived to be less trustworthy, such as transnational institutions.  
 One major flaw in the knowledge gap literature is that there is no indication that a high 
level of public understanding of GMO is sufficient or even necessary for GMO acceptance. This 
truth is perhaps nowhere else better illustrated than in neighboring South Africa. South Africa 
ranks second in the world for total GMO crop hectare production per year, behind only the 
United States (GMO Compass). Despite this fact, a 2005 study performed by the HSRC found 
that 63% of respondents in South Africa were unaware as to whether or not they had consumed 
GMO food. When asked if they believed it was possible to “put animal genes in to plants”, the 
basis for many genetically modified strains of crops, 62% indicated that they didn’t know, and 
24% indicated that it was not possible. Further, 88% of respondents reported that they did not 
know what they thought when they heard the phrase “genetic modification”, with the remaining 
12% running the gamut with positive and negative connotations (Rule & Ianga, 2004). Clearly, 
the key to GMO acceptance does not lie in an increased public understanding of the technology 
alone. 
 Furthermore, there is evidence that small farmers are in favor of increasing GMO strain 
usage (Sitko, 10). Additionally, while awaiting shipment back out of the country, several stores 
of GMO grain were broken in to and looted by villagers (GM Maize Looted by Starving 
Villagers, 2002). The reluctance to accept GMO, even in the face of famine, does not appear to 
be a trait shared by all Zambians. Indeed it would appear that the chief opponents of transgenic 
crops existing within the spheres of the government and large agricultural firms. 
The Precautionary Principle 
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 An instructive body of literature regarding the causal mechanism of GMO rejection in 
Southern Africa focuses in on the “precautionary principle” as a guiding light for policy 
decisions. This body of literature is a logical offshoot of the “Knowledge Gap” hypothesis, 
positing that there is not a lack of knowledge of GMO, but a lack of complete certainty in the 
safety of the technology and it is that lack of certainty which necessitates rejection. The 
precautionary principle was first articulated as a standard by which to make policy decisions in 
the United Nations Rio Conference, or Earth Summit, in 1992. The use of the precautionary 
principle as a means of evaluating environmental policy was formalized in the Lisbon Treaty, in 
2000, specifically as it pertained to dealing with environmental polluters. The precautionary 
principle literature is linked to South African GMO rejection by a statement made by the 
Zambian Agricultural Minister, citing the precautionary principle, in conjunction with the current 
lack of a scientific consensus, as necessitating the rejection.   
 In large part, the connection between the phrase and the E.U. was seen as further 
indication that the rejecting states were merely mirroring the policies of Brussels, in an effort to 
ensure future access to European markets. As the aforementioned “Market Preservation” 
literature would indicate, however, it seems that market factors do not appear to be predictive of 
GMO rejection. Instead, it would appear that the adoption of the precautionary principle sets an 
artificially low bar for those NGOs that seek to persuade Southern African states to reject GMO 
solutions to food shortages. The precautionary principle shifts the burden of proof entirely off of 
those advocating maintaining the status quo, GMO opponents, and on to the shoulders of GMO 
advocates. It sets an unreachably high bar for advocates, as any vague notion of future risk, 
regardless of how slight, is seen as sufficient evidence for rejection. The use of the precautionary 
principle on the parts of the rejecting states also falsely holds the maintenance of the status quo 
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as being a low-risk proposition, with risk being segregated on the “change” side of the decision 
tree. Thus the Zambian scientists sent to the United States and Europe to evaluate the long term 
risks of GMO would have never arrived at any conclusion save for complete rejection.  
The “Precautionary Principle” and “Market Preservation” literature are simultaneously 
weakened by the fact that the most commonly offered GMO crops are not those that have a large 
export market in the European Union. The theory behind the former school of thought is that the 
use of the precautionary principle as a reason for rejection is a paraphrase of the current E.U. 
policy regarding GMO. The Southern African states, seeing the EU market as key to their 
economy, simply adopted the same policy as the EU itself. This argument falls apart, however, 
when the “Market Preservation” literature is rendered spurious by the fact that the chief export 
markets for the Southern African states are other African states – with loose GMO policies. 
 The chief shortcoming of the “Precautionary Principle” literature lies in the lack of a 
clear logical reasoning for the persistent rejection of GMO. While it is possible the Zambian 
government has continued to resist the importation of transgenic seeds and foodstuff for purely 
principled reasons, it seems unlikely that there is not more to this story. The literature takes for 
granted the safety of GMO and, like the work surrounding the “Knowledge Gap” hypothesis, 
presumes states taking an anti-GMO position have done so because they have been insufficiently 
convinced of the science. It reduces the famine states’ decision to either accepting GMO grain or 
rejecting it out of a misguided fear, leaving no room for the possibility that a policy of 
acceptance may simply not be in line with the rejecting state’s long term plans for food 
sustainability.  
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The precautionary principle literature also fails to account for the change in policy on the 
part of Zimbabwe, Mozambique, and Malawi. If the precautionary principle prevented those 
three states from accepting milled grain, what changed and prompted them to change policies? If 
the precautionary principle was presumed true and taken to be steering policy, it would have to 
be assumed that states following the principle would arrive at policy decisions so varied so as to 
render the predictive value of the hypothesis nil. Finally, the precautionary principle literature is 
substantially weakened by the inadequacy of the aforementioned “Market Preservation” 
literature. The literature turns on the idea that the rejecting states were using the “precautionary 
principle” term as a nod to Brussels and the Lisbon Treaty; so with the rejection of the market 
preservation hypothesis we must also reject the precautionary principle.  
“Food Sovereignty”, NGOs, and Small Farmers 
 
 The vast majority of Africa’s 33 million small farms are on plots of land consisting of 
less than 10 hectares (Altieri, 2009). Most of these farms rely on “low resource” farming 
methods, being locally self-sufficient. Going hand in hand with this local resource reliance is a 
lack of any sort of overarching organization representing the needs of small farmers. While 80% 
of African farms are “small-farms”, and two-thirds of those small-farms are less than two 
hectares in size (Altieri, 2009), respondents to a survey in South Africa on agricultural hurdles 
faced by the region “perceived the typical small-scale farmer problems (such as post harvest 
losses, lack of irrigation facilities, bad transport network and inadequate market conditions) as 
not being very important” (Aerni, 2005). What is or is not beneficial for small farmers in Africa 
has, in large part, been vocalized by virtually any individual and organization other than the 
farmers themselves. 
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 The standard bearers for food sovereignty and environmental concerns have mostly 
emerged as environmental NGOs. They have framed the topic of GMO as an extension of the 
Green Revolution, and rejected biotechnology as a solution. A key distinction found in the 
environmentalist GMO literature is whether the Green Revolution “bypassed Africa”, as Kenyan 
President Daniel Arap Moi stated, or whether it “failed Africa.”; “The technologies did not 
bypass Africa: they were available but unpopular and ineffective” (Kuyek, 2002). Environmental 
and other GMO-opposed NGOs have also framed the debate in terms of protecting small 
farmer’s intellectual property rights. They tie accepting GMO to accepting the western 
“acceptance of intellectual property rights on living organisms” (Kuyek, 2002). The NGOs 
present themselves as representing the interests of the small farmers, and ensuring the future 
“food sovereignty” of states in the region.  
The focus by NGOs on the implications of GMO for small farmers in Southern Africa is 
problematic. There is every reason to believe that small farmers would indeed benefit from the 
use of transgenic, drought or pest resistant, crops. The high-minded ideal of “food sovereignty” 
is married to the image of the small farmer, planting heirloom seeds on land he has cultivated for 
generations. The reality seems to be that GMO’s chief opponents lie in the government and 
large-scale farmers, not small rural farmers eking out a living. Indeed, Zambian President Levy 
Mwanawasa was quoted as saying his people would rather starve than be poisoned by GMO 
(Conko & Prakash, 2004) while, at the same time, an underground market for smuggled GM 
soybeans was thriving and donated GMO grain had to be kept under lock and key to prevent 
villagers from raiding GMO grain being “stored” at a chief’s palace (Zambia Denies GM Aid for 
Refugees, 2002).   
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 Small farmers in Southern Africa seem to be constantly spoken for, though rarely heard 
from. The body of literature surrounding the topic of food sovereignty and the rights of small 
farmers contributes much to the debate in terms of what may cause a state to reject 
biotechnology solutions to food shortages, in the midst of a famine. As previously mentioned, 
there is every reason to believe small-farms would benefit from the use of transgenic crops and 
“they may in fact be warmly embraced” (Sitko, 10). Thus, any pressure being placed by NGOs 
on governments to reject GMO would appear to be serving the interests of the NGOs or perhaps 
the government, but not those of the small farmers.  
 In states where GMO has been accepted, as in Zimbabwe, there are hurdles to food 
security that amount to more than simple input shortages for the agricultural sector. In the case of 
Zimbabwe, “food security” can be little affected by the presence or absence of GMO; land 
resettlement programs have created a food crisis that no amount of agricultural inputs will be 
able to resolve in the short term. Indeed, “at a time when the food security situation in other 
countries in the region has begun to show some improvement, Zimbabwe’s crisis has widened” 
(Loewenson, 2003, pg. 4). Unresolved land resettlement issues make acceptance of donated grain 
and other foodstuffs, as in the WFP GMO program, a necessity. The land resettlement crisis has 
further hampered Zimbabwe’s ability to create an infrastructure of support for its own 
agricultural sector, leaving the state with no immediate method for a production-encouraging 
alternative to food aid. Thus in a way, “food sovereignty” is not an immediately salient issue for 
the accepting states in the midst of famine, and “food security”, with the inclusion of food aid, is 
a more achievable short term goal.  
Crop Symbolism 
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 The “Crop Symbolism” school of thought incorporates some of the assertions made by 
the preceding areas of research but view them from a discursive perspective; namely, researchers 
in this arena see large scale agricultural programs as being a key symbol of achieved modernity 
for the farmer in a post-colonial context. The concept of symbolic value inherent in a national 
crop is not unique to Southern Africa. A crop’s symbolic value can be deeply ingrained in a 
culture, independent from any dietary or economic reliance on that particular crop, as in the case 
of Japanese rice. Indeed, “rice has become a dominant metaphor of the Japanese despite the fact 
that a large segment of the population has always been engaged in occupations other than rice 
agriculture and … rice has not been a quantatively important source of food” (Ohnuki-Tierney, 
1993, pp. 6). Historical circumstances and experiences can imbue a crop with more significance 
within a culture than the sum of its subsistence or export value.  
 The symbolic value of a crop can exhibit more permanence than its economic or food 
production utility. In the case of Zambia, crops have been proposed that are more drought 
resistant than the dominant maize, and yet have struggled to gain acceptance. Cassava and 
sorghum, despite promising higher yields and a better chance at Zambian food sovereignty, have 
largely been viewed, in contrast to maize, as steps away from modernity. This has little to do 
with the actual agricultural production of maize, and more to do with what maize production has 
come to symbolize for the Zambian people. Maize is more than just a food and export crop for 
Zambia, it is symbolically powerful: “A full butala (silo), which is often spatially positioned 
within homesteads in full view of passers-by, identifies the owner as a ‘good farmer’, with the 
necessary knowledge to negotiate access to inputs and to use them appropriately” (Sitko, 3). 
Possessing the knowledge to cultivate maize is equated with self-sufficiency, the modern farmer, 
and modernity itself. Attempts to supplement the food supply by cultivating the more drought-
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tolerant cassava have met with similar fates to that of GMO: cassava success in “Zambia requires 
a representation of cassava as a technological advancement and not as a technological 
regression” (Sitko, 10). If agricultural programs in that state are to be successful, they must 
proceed with an understanding of what “being modern” means to the Zambian farmer 
specifically, and in post-colonial states more generally.  
The research within the “Crop Symbolism” school of thought is the literature I found most 
salient for this research project. An understanding of the specific needs, conceptualizations and 
priorities of the recipient states is necessary if food programs such as that attempted by the WFP 
are to be successful. In post-colonial states it is especially imperative that local knowledge and 
the cultural importance of subsistence crops be taken in to account before any relief program is 
attempted.  
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III. Case Selection: Zambia and Zimbabwe 
 
The 2002 famine affected all of Southern Africa, creating a laboratory for examining the 
variance in food policies across that region. Agriculture is an economically important sector for 
much of Southern Africa, including the four states the WFP sought to donate grain to: Zambia, 
Zimbabwe, Mozambique and Malawi. The sole variation in the GMO policies of the Southern 
African states was in the decision of Zambia to persist in rejecting GMO grain, even after the 
WFP agreed to have the maize milled, which would destroy any potentially viable seeds. The 
aim of this paper is to explain the contributing factors behind the continued rejection of GMO 
grain on the part of Zambia. Following the rejection, news outlets and academic scholarship alike 
sought to explain Zambian reluctance to accept GM food through overly simplified causal 
mechanisms. There were assumptions that it was a case of a backwards technophobic state 
dooming its population to famine out of a fear of progress, or that it was the result of a simple 
economic cost-benefit analysis with regards to export markets. The solutions then were 
educating the Zambian people on the safety of GMO or convincing the European Union to issue 
a decree that there was no GM import ban on the horizon, respectively. Shifting the focus away 
from simple cause and effect narratives and on to the actual motivations and concerns behind 
Zambia’s rejection can help ensure future programs intended to alleviate food supply issues are 
more acceptable for the recipient states.  
In examining the cases of the Southern African states that rejected GMO, the most efficient 
course of action for teasing out causal mechanisms is juxtaposing states in a “most-similar 
systems” research design and choosing from among the initial rejecters is the most logical point 
from which to proceed. An interesting variation is apparent when Zambia breaks rank with the 
rest of the rejecting states and refuses to accept milled GM grain. The agreement by the donating 
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states to mill grain prior to shipment to Southern Africa sufficiently satisfied all of the famine-
stricken region, save for Zambia, and so their motivations for rejection might be presumed to 
differ from the accepting states. In this section an argument is made for the sufficient similarity 
of Zambia and Zimbabwe so as to allow for a useful comparison. 
Primacy of Maize 
 
The most important similarity between the two cases lies in their shared primacy of maize 
as a subsistence crop. Maize provides more than half of the caloric intake for the average 
Zambian, with Cassava coming in a distant second at 13% of calories consumed (Chapoto, 
Govereh, Haggblade et al, 2010). Wheat has become a more important staple crop in recent 
years, but remains behind both maize and cassava nationally and in most regions individually. 
Interestingly, Zambian “urban areas tend to favor wheat consumption, relative to rural areas” 
(Chapoto & Govereh & Haggblad et al, 2010) which leads an additional political wrinkle to 
Zambia’s 2002 rejection of non-GMO wheat as a maize alternative.   
 The case is similar in Zimbabwe, with maize as the chief staple food, consisting of 47% 
of Zimbabwean caloric intake (FAO Country Report, 2009). Domestic yields have consistently 
fallen short of sufficient production to keep up with needs, however, and Zimbabwe has 
necessarily turned to imported grains. Additionally, shortages in foreign currency have led to 
periodic grain shortages (FAO Country Report, 2009). The comparable role in both cases helps 
rule out the possibility that the Zambian rejection can be explained by differing levels of reliance 
on maize as a staple crop. Zimbabwe’s reliance on imported maize, more so than its neighbor 
Zambia, is a potentially confounding difference between the two states. It would seem, however, 
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that this difference helps to explain, through a sort of path dependence or inertia, Zambia’s 
reluctance to accept donated foodstuffs – even in a famine situation.  
Economic Similarities 
 In terms of economies, Zambia and Zimbabwe do differ in pure GDP numbers. The 
economy of Zambia is roughly twice that of Zimbabwe, $19.219 million USD and $8.8 million 
USD, respectively. Likewise, their per capita GDP come down along similar lines, with Zambia 
coming in at $1,611 and Zimbabwe $515. These are limitations to the comparisons between the 
two states but, it is the opinion of the author that they do not preclude the two cases from being 
compared along the lines necessary for the purposes in this paper.  
 The key similarities for the purposes of this paper are, however, the percentage of the 
labor force in the agricultural sector; the percentage of each states GDP stemming from the 
agricultural sector, and the percentage of the population below the poverty line. On these 
numbers, the two cases are quite similar. Zambia’s agricultural sector accounts for $21.5% of 
their GDP, and Zimbabwe’s is 20.4%. The percentage of the labor force employed in the 
agricultural sector is 65% and 80% in Zambia and Zimbabwe, respectively. While the difference 
between these sector percentages are not insignificant, for the purposes of this paper they are 
sufficiently similar to allow for comparison, as a reasonable argument  could not be made that 
merely 60% of the labor force being employed in the agricultural sector allows the Zimbabwean 
state to engage in practices that might undermine the agricultural market. The agricultural sector 
employs a large percentage of the population in both states and, as such, it can be assumed that 
both governments would be loathed to endanger their agricultural sector.  
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 The chief export product for Zimbabwe is cotton, whereas Zambia relies on maize and 
soybean. Likewise, the chief export partners for Zambia and Zimbabwe differ, with Zambia 
trading chiefly with Switzerland and Zimbabwe the Democratic Republic of the Congo. This 
paper is limited, therefore, to a consideration of the rejection/acceptance of GMO maize for 
domestic consumption in each state. The chosen research question surrounds what caused 
Zambia to reject milled GMO grain for consumption, and Zimbabwe to accept the same. The 
question as to what caused the two states to reject GMO maize seeds, while touched on here, is 
one for future research.   
Colonial Legacies 
Zambia and Zimbabwe share a colonial legacy in their history as colonies of the United 
Kingdom. Zambia achieved independence in 1964, while Zimbabwe declared independence in 
1965 but was not recognized as a sovereign state by the United Kingdom until 1980. Controlling 
for colonial legacies helps limit the possibility that there exists clear differences between the 
cases with regards to interactions with the west. While no two states share identical histories, 
controlling for colonizing power seems an efficient way to minimize widely varying pre-
independence trajectories. 
During the late nineteenth century and first half of the twentieth, Zambia existed as the 
British colony of Northern Rhodesia. Its counterpart Southern Rhodesia, now Zimbabwe, was 
economically unimportant to the British, and was granted white “self-government” in 1923. 
Northern Rhodesia, however, contained copper reserves that, by 1928, were found to be 
significantly larger than was once thought. As such, Northern Rhodesia was a profitable colony 
for the United Kingdom and mining strikes and independence movements were put down with 
equal force. The turning point for Northern Rhodesian independence came with the election of 
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the first African majority in the Northern Rhodesian Legislative Council, in 1962. A vote of 
secession was held and, at least in birth, the Republic of Zambia was formed with minimal 
violence.  
Zambia’s independence pre-dated Zimbabwe’s, but the newly-independent state faced 
considerable challenges. The lack of a developed bureaucracy, internal conflicts, and the scarcity 
of independent African states with which to trade, coupled with the state’s reliance on the 
shrinking copper market, forced Zambia to take out large loans from the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF) and World Bank. Through the Cold War, Zambia adopted a leftist political stance, 
nationalized many of the major industries, and engaged in import substitution industrialization. 
The Zambian economy rose and fall with the boom and bust of the copper industry and, 
following the collapse of the copper industry in the 1970s, fell in to a recession from which it has 
not yet fully recovered.   
Zimbabwe declared independence through a Unilateral Declaration of Independence 
(UDI) in 1965, but was not formally recognized as a sovereign state by the United Kingdom until 
1980. While officially in rebellion, trade sanctions were imposed upon Zimbabwe in 1966 and 
1968. This, coupled with an ongoing guerilla war between nationalist forces and the white 
majority government, left the state in straits not unlike those found in Zambia. Additionally the 
Zimbabwean state was weakened by a civil war between the Zimbabwe African People’s Union 
(ZAPU), led by Joshua Nkomo, and the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU), lead by 
Robert Mugabe.  
A shared colonial legacy of colonization by the United Kingdom, coupled with a rocky 
start to life as independent states, renders the colonial legacies of the two states sufficiently 
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comparable for the purposes of this paper. Differences between the two state’s legacies are not 
insignificant, with Zimbabwe enduring a prolonged civil war and considerably later 
independence date. However, while Zimbabwe was considered in rebellion from the date of its 
declared independence, 1965, to the date it was granted independence, 1980, no attempts were 
made by the United Kingdom to regain control by force. This is likely due to Zimbabwean 
whites retaining control of most of the arable land, a condition comparable to that found in 
Zambia.  
Land Apportionment 
 Prior to colonial involvement, Zambia and Zimbabwe shared a notion of land as not 
something that is owned by one individual or another, “People were linked to land through ethnic 
groupings. … However, with the coming in of the western colonialism and capitalist-oriented 
thinking, control over land started to emerge” (Ng’ombe, 2007). Zambia and Zimbabwe were 
both marked by predominant, if not exclusive, white land ownership during colonialism.  
A problem common to both Zambia and Zimbabwe in the post-colonial era has been the 
issue of land reform. In Zimbabwe, the Mugabe government has engaged in forced land reform 
for a number of years. Just prior to recognized independence in 1979, the majority of arable land 
was in the hands of the small minority white population. By 2010, land seizures left fewer than 
400 white landed farmers in Zimbabwe, down from 4,500 in 2000. This forcible land 
redistribution has been controversial and an entire body of literature exists revolving around 
whether or not it has been successful. For the purposes of this paper, however, suffice it to say 
that Zimbabwe has had its fair share of land reform issues. 
Leahey, 29 
 
 Zambia has had issues of land reform, if not on the scope and scale of that found in 
Zimbabwe. The 1964 independent Zambia was granted a state comprised of three categories of 
land: native reserves, crown and trust land (Ng’ombe, 2007). Crown land was given to the state 
while the rest remained in private hands. President Kenneth Kaunda, and the United National 
Independence Party (UNIP) enacted legislation allowing unworked land to be redistributed 
(Ibid). The focus for the time was on domestic redistribution, and a discouragement of foreign 
investment. Later in 1995, following the move to a multi-party system, the Zambian government 
passed a Lands Act in the hopes of attracting foreign investment (Ibid). Further  in 2011, Zambia 
enacted policies to encourage South Africans to homestead and grow maize in the country 
(Pearce, 2011). Land redistribution has been an ongoing priority of Zambian governments since 
independence, but it never reached the destabilizing levels of that found in Zimbabwe.    
Limitations 
No comparison of two states is perfect, and Zambia and Zimbabwe differ on a number of 
variables that have been touched on under the previous subheadings. For the purposes of this 
research question the two cases provide the best basis from which to launch a comparison. The 
research question necessarily limits the cases from which to choose from to the five initial 
rejecting Southern African states. Significant differences in GDP and colonial legacies, as well 
as variations in the chief agricultural products and reliance on the agricultural sector, eliminated 
all but Zimbabwe and Mozambique as reasonable comparative cases. Mozambique was 
eliminated owing to the fact that maize is not their chief agricultural product, neither for export 
nor domestic consumption. I felt a reliance on maize was the most important factor if a “most 
similar systems” research design was to be used, and thus Zimbabwe was chosen as the 
comparative case.  
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Comparing Zambia and Zimbabwe is not without precedent: In 2000, Goldman compared the 
two states, along with South Africa, for the purposes of poverty analysis and rural development 
(Goldman, 2000). Likewise, Thierfelder and Wall compared the two states for an investigation of 
conservation agriculture as a means to mitigate future effects of climate change, and specifically 
focused on maize production and productivity (Thierfelder & Wall, 2010). Finally, Rusike, 
Howard & Maredia built a comparative analysis of seed sector evolution around the two states 
(1997) following earlier seed sector structural reforms. While a comparison of Zambia and 
Zimbabwe is not without its problems, it is the most reasonable way to go about answering the 
research question and earlier comparisons by established authors left me confident that my case 
selection was sufficiently justified.  
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IV. Maize and Zambian Modernity 
The knee-jerk reaction of much of the Western world to the Zambian rejection of the GMO 
maize was to search for a single causal factor. The Zambian government persisted in rejecting 
the milled grain out of a fear of the safety of transgenic foods, or to preserve the European export 
market, or from a fundamental misunderstanding of GM. The reality is something of a 
confluence of issues which, taken together, begs the question as to why the WFP chose the 
course of action it did. A cursory understanding of the conditions in Zambia would raise 
questions as to the wisdom of treating the Southern African famine with the one-size-fits-all 
WFP grain donation solution. In 2002, the Zambian government already had a system of 
agricultural subsidies for inputs such as hybrid seeds and fertilizer in place to support the 
agricultural sector. Aid would have better come in the form of agricultural inputs, and would 
have been more in keeping with the plan Zambia had in place for achieving its own food security 
and sovereignty. With an understanding of the differences between Southern African states, such 
as Zambia and Zimbabwe, treating famine-stricken Southern Africa with a uniform model of 
relief is to completely ignore the steps the receiving states have already taken to improve their 
situation.  
 Zambia’s maize industry has its roots in the copper industry. Maize cultivation expanded 
and thrived as the copper industry boomed, and continued to be an integral part of the economy 
even after the bust. The link between maize and copper also made the crop symbolically 
important to Zambians. The collapse of copper left Zambia a partially-modernized state, as the 
industrialization that came with the expansion of copper had brought with it a level of 
urbanization that was unsustainable post-copper. When the copper mines were shuttered, maize 
continued to be subsidized by the state as an important source of employment and food for the 
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disenfranchised urban workers. The input subsidization economy eventually became important in 
and of itself, and the fertilizer and seed markets had their own path dependence that made the 
2002 grain donation unlikely to be acceptable to a subset of the political elites.  
Maize and Copper 
 The cultivation and production of maize has been an integral part of the Zambian 
economy since the discovery of copper in the early 20
th
 century. Demand for maize increased 
steadily as mining operations expanded and continued to grow rapidly “because of … surplus 
land, new varieties better suited to smallholders’ conditions, favorable input prices, and the 
physical availability of input and product marketing outlets” and by the late 1980s, maize 
subsidies and support constituted 17% of the government budget (Byerlee & Eicher, 45). Small 
farmers initially grew maize in addition to other subsistence crops, such as sorghum, groundnuts 
and pumpkins. These alternative crops gave way to nearly exclusive maize production, thanks to 
maize’s ability to thrive in the regions surrounding the mining towns in the Copper Belt. 
Technologies imported from South Africa and the United States, including hybrid seeds and 
improved fertilizers, further cemented the crop as a subsistence mainstay.  
 The initial reliance of the copper industry on maize production, and the Zambian 
economy’s reliance on the copper industry, made governmental support of maize production a 
necessity. The Zambian government directly subsidized maize and made fertilizer and seed 
available on credit. “Fertilizer use quadrupled between the 1960s and the late 1980s and fertilizer 
consumption in the remote areas increased from 15 to 39 percent” (Byerlee & Eicher, 53).  But 
the relationship between copper and maize runs deeper than economics. After the collapse of the 
copper industry, it was maize production that would help Zambians redefine their modernity. 
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Zambian Self-Perception 
 Few states have endured the kind of boom and bust cycle that has been the last forty 
years of Zambian history. Ferguson (1999) refers to it as “modernization through the looking 
glass, where modernity is the object of nostalgic reverie, and ‘backwardness’ the anticipated (or 
dreaded) future” (p. 10). Ferguson argues that “Zambia’s recent crisis is not only an economic 
crisis but a crisis of meaning, in which the way that people are able to understand their 
experience and to imbue it with significance and dignity has been dramatically eroded” (Ibid).  
This conception of modernity lost is not limited to the copper industry, but has implications for 
current and future policy decisions in Zambia. In the absence of copper, the cultivation and 
harvesting of maize came to symbolize the modern Zambia.   
 In the decade following independence, as is true of many post-colonial states, there was a 
perception among the new ruling elite that the vestiges of colonial rule had to be shaken off if 
modernization was to be fully achieved. All aspects of the economy, including the agricultural 
sector, would need to be retooled for the move to modernity. The subsistence economy was to be 
revamped, and Maize Control Boards (MCBs) were introduced to provide a market for small-
farmers and subsidize the production of the crop. These MCBs “provided small-scale Zambian 
farmers with the tools of modern, intensive agriculture, such as fertilizer and hybrid seeds” 
(Sitko, 2007, pg. 5). The early independent Zambian infrastructure was built around the 
cultivation and harvesting of maize, and the weight of the government was thrown behind a 
model of modernization that incorporated urban and rural Zambia, asking subsistence farmers to 
“join the urban population on the path to modernity” (Sitko, 2007, pg. 5). Far from being left 
behind, Zambia’s agricultural sector was seen as an important part in the modernization process, 
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both economically and as a method of mitigating the effects of a protracted modernization 
process. 
At the point of independence, in 1964, Zambia was a rapidly urbanizing state. The copper 
industry had propelled Zambians in to industrialization, and “urbanization was understood to 
involve not simply a movement in space but an epochal leap in evolutionary time” (Ferguson, 
1999, pp. 4). Modernization and urbanization were inextricably linked, and Zambia was 
modernizing quickly. The idea of a convergence with a European model of industrialized state 
“thus seemed to be no speculation” (Ibid). The copper boom of the 1960s had brought with it a 
revolution of rising expectations, and the copper bust had rendered those expectations 
unachievable. Ferguson (1999) argues that much of the traditional literature on the Zambian 
Copperbelt boom era glosses over the effect industrialization had on urbanization, opting instead 
for a simple cause-and-effect narrative. He does not debate, however, the fact that the era 
produced an “expectation of urban permanence” (Ibid) among a subset of Zambian population. 
As such, the point of no return had been crossed for Zambians: the ascent to modernity and 
urbanization had been cut short, and left Zambians unable to return to their rural roots, and yet 
unable to achieve this urban permanence. The Zambian state sought ways to return the urban 
workers to the agricultural sector and continue the post-Copperbelt Boom march to modernity, 
through shifting subsidies from the urban population to the agricultural sector. Part of this 
process included ending urban food subsidies (Macmillan, 1993, pg. 709) in an effort to drive the 
population back to towards rural regions and relieve some of the pressure on the urban economy. 
Post-Independence: Zambian Agricultural Programs 
 The Zambian government had a vision for the post-Copperbelt boom Zambia as one 
marked by a renewed commitment to agriculture. Following the bust of the copper industry in 
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the 1970s, the state enacted a series of policies that encouraged urban workers, many formerly 
employed by the copper industry, to resettle in the countryside. The plan was that “urban 
workers might revitalize agriculture by investing in farming the local countryside … surrounding 
the towns of the Copperbelt [as it] is remarkably little developed in agricultural terms” 
(Ferguson, 1999, p. 148). Zambia thus undertook their land reform early on in their 
independence, contrasted against Zimbabwe’s continued reforms away from “backwards” 
agrarian practices in the 1980s, and their subsequent resettlement policies of the late 1990s.  
 From independence to 1989, the Zambian state supported agricultural input subsidies 
through a centralized marketing parastatal called NAMBOARD. NAMBOARD was a buyer of 
last resort for domestically produced maize, and ensured both food security for the urban 
population and income for rural farmers. It set price floors for maize, allowing the market to 
dictate prices above the floor price. Prior to liberalizing in 1986 in response the Economic 
Structural Adjustment Programme (ESAP) NAMBOARD operated as a monopoly, centralizing 
the maize and fertilizer markets. In 1989, NAMBOARD was dissolved and responsibilities for 
maize reserve maintenance and fertilizer importation was shifted to the Zambian Co-operative 
Federation (ZCF) and the Nitrogen Chemicals of Zambia (NCZ); the subsidization of inputs 
remained a focal point of the state even in a liberalized maize market. 
 Through the 1990s the Zambian government rolled out rural group businesses (RGB) and 
input and crop depots, to assist rural farmers with increasing maize yields and bringing their 
harvest to market. The programs met with a modicum of success, as in 1999 participating 
farmers earning $198 more per year than nonparticipants (Kelly et al, 2003, pg. 390).  The 
Zambian state was committed to subsidizing input credit and output marketing through well-
organized farmer’s associations, and put the weight of their agricultural assistance behind those 
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programs. Indeed, it has been posited that Zambia’s input credit system is little more than a 
government handout, as the repayment rate has seldom risen above 40% in a year (FSRP 
Zambia, 2002).  
 Despite earlier efforts, in 2001 the Zambian government commissioned a study that 
found that “only 30% of smallholders had access to improved seeds and just 20% had access to 
fertilizers” (Baltzer & Hanson, 15). Later in 2002, months prior to the offer and rejection of the 
WFP’s GMO maize, the Zambian government launched the Fertilizer Support Program (FSP). 
The initial aim of the FSP was to provide Zambian farmers with directly subsidized fertilizer for 
a period of two years, existing as a temporary means of boosting agricultural production and 
encouraging the use of hybrid maize seeds. Since 2002 the program continued and was expanded 
upon, with expenditures reached ZMK 150 billion in 2007 (WorldBank). The FSP’s successor, 
the Farmer Input Support Program (FISP) has taken over where the FSP left off, installed as a 
more permanent arm of the Zambian government, providing 75% subsidies for purchases of 
improved maize seed and fertilizer. 
 The Zambian state has exhibited continuous commitment to its agricultural sector, and to 
the support of farmers with input subsidies and credits. Whether or not their methods are 
effective remains an open question, though the steady increase in their harvest and yield in the 
years since the famine would suggest something is working. Regardless of the efficacy of their 
programs, the Zambian state clearly sees the promotion of their domestic agricultural sector, and 
the subsidization of inputs, as an integral part of their move towards food sovereignty and 
security. Large amounts of money has moved through the fertilizer and seed subsidy systems in 
the decades following independence, ensuring that any foreign food aid that might undermine 
that system would be met with trepidation at best and hostility at worst.  
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Figure 1: Charting the Path from Zambian Independence to GMO Rejection 
 
 
Path Dependence 
 Years of input subsidization has created several classes of individuals in Zambia that are 
reliant on the continuation of these programs. First there are the farmers, large and small, that 
have come to rely on subsidized fertilizer and seeds, and guaranteed lines of credit. Second, but 
no less importantly, there are those individuals unofficially (or illegally) tied to the subsidy 
market. The subsidy and credit programs have been focused mostly on the hurdles involved in 
getting credit and fertilizer to the most rural of farmers, and have done little to control for 
skimming and patronage.  
 The Zambian fertilizer distribution programs, pre-dating the FSP, were structured in a 
way that did little to insulate them against corruption. These programs were structured so that 
“local ‘agents’ receive program fertilizer on credit according to procedures that consistently 
lacked transparency [and] the agents’ role has been to forward the fertilizer to ‘resource poor’ 
farmers on credit, and … to recover the loans through maize purchases” (Jayne, Govereh, 
Wanzala et al, 2003). This lead to widespread corruption, with the Deputy Information Minister 
being fired for stealing $300,000 worth of fertilizer from a distribution program in 2003 
(“Zambian Minister Sacked for ‘Fraud’”, 2003).  The existence of a well-developed bureaucracy 
for input subsidizing and output marketing in Zambia meant that there was a subset of political 
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elites that would not have been amenable to a grain-donation solution to the 2002 famine. The 
flip side of the successes of the fertilizer programs and input credit subsidies is the reality of the 
corruption in the system; in either case a segment of society is reliant on the input subsidization 
program. 
 The Zambian input subsidy programs have exhibited a large degree of path dependence. 
Despite calls from the private sector to abolish government-subsidies for inputs such as 
fertilizers and hybrid seeds, and despite  the fact that “Fertilizer use by smallholder farmers has 
declined precipitously since the 1980s” (Jayne, Govereh, & Wanzala et al, 315), the government 
programs have continued unabated and, as has been previously mentioned, have been expanded 
upon. Additionally, the state has not taken steps to make improvements in the transportation 
infrastructure or attempted to expand educational programs for rural farmers on new agricultural 
technology or crop techniques. They have instead continued to support and subsidize maize 
cultivation and farmer inputs in this one very specific manner, through fertilizer subsidization 
and credit systems. This is clearly the Zambian solution to the Zambian food security and 
sovereignty issue.  
The Zambian economy has for nearly a century relied on maize, both economically and 
culturally. While maize was initially cultivated to feed the burgeoning copper industry, it has 
become symbolically important since the copper bust. Thus it wasn’t GMO that threatened the 
Zambian state in 2002, but the potential for undermining the Zambian maize economy and its 
related input economies. The WFP sought to solve the Southern African food supply issue with a 
generic Southern African solution and in so doing failed to recognize the importance maize 
played in the Zambian state and the comparative advantage of Zambia’s agricultural 
infrastructure. While other states, as in the case of Zimbabwe to be discussed in section V, had 
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embarked upon the path to modernity through other means, Zambia had inextricably linked their 
success in modernity to their maize cultivation and harvest.  
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V. Zimbabwe: Land Redistribution and Modernity 
 
Zimbabwe is a study in land reform unto itself. In the 1990s, the Zimbabwean state pursued a 
radical land redistribution program unlike anything found elsewhere in Southern Africa. Large-
scale, white owned “corporate” farms were acquired by the state and redistributed to native 
Zimbabweans in an effort to bolster the Mugabe regime’s revolutionary credibility. Land 
apportionment and reapportionment has long been at the forefront of Zimbabwean politics, and 
the state’s economy has been at the whim of the current status of land reform for some time. 
Indeed, Zimbabwean independence came about in large part due to the disparities between black 
and white land holdings.  
Early land redistribution programs followed a willing buyer/willing seller policy, with 
resettled populations being drawn largely from landless farmers and veterans of the war for 
independence. “Resettlement was intended to create a rural farming community that would move 
from subsistence to commercial production”(Bourdillon, Hebinck, Hoddinott et al, 8). The 
Zimbabwean land redistribution program sought to resolve the same issues that Zambia 
attempted to mitigate with agricultural subsidies and maize, specifically: subsistence, 
employment, and the move to modernity. However, it did so in a way that made the agricultural 
sector appear unstable to foreign investment, and failed to provide the new landholders with the 
support necessary for successful production. 
Land Reform 
 
In the 1980s, there was a move away from large scale farms and farming practices, and 
renewed focus on small resource poor farmers in Zimbabwe. “The idea was to transform the 
poor, backward, inefficient farmer from the reserves to a fulltime farmer who followed all the 
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recommendations stipulated by the planners and extensionists” (Chaumba, Scoones & Wolmer, 
2003, pg. 6).  In the 1980s the perceived obstruction to development and modernity were the 
conservative vestiges of a “backwards” existence: “chiefs, headmen, and other traditional 
elements of rural society” (Ibid). This flight away from traditional farming practices lead to land 
reapportionment policies favoring resettlement schemes that benefited political elites positioned 
to take advantage of the lack of transparency and oversight.  
The land redistribution programs were not as interested in the fair distribution of land as they 
were in the return of arable farmland to non-white Zimbabweans. The resettlement era of 
Zimbabwean history also drew a clear dividing line between the “resettlement” areas and their 
less productive “communal” counterparts. The full weight of the Zimbabwean government was 
thrown behind the former, while the latter were held as obstructions to modernization. This in no 
small part due to Zimbabwe’s independence being achieved just as the “major shifts in the 
dynamics of international capitalism … soon to be termed ‘globalisation’, were beginning” 
(Bernstein, 2003, p. 212). In order to compete in the global marketplace, the perception was that 
farming practices had to be modernized, and in order for the benefits of modernization to be 
enjoyed by native Zimbabweans, land holdings had to be more equitably split between black and 
white. For Zimbabwe, land reform was and continues to be used as a major tool and yardstick for 
movement towards modernity.  
The focus on land apportionment at the expense of production has led to economic reversals, 
as in 1999, following a decade of consistently high agricultural sector production, the 
technocratic land resettlement policies of the 1980s and early 1990s were rejected in favor of 
farm occupations and a resettlement of native Zimbabweans on vast swaths of previously white-
owned land; the resettlements have been “cast … as either a spontaneous rejection of 
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bureaucratic process of land reform or a state-orchestrated process” (Chaumba, Scoonies & 
Wolmer, 2003, pg. 9). While whether these farm occupations were state-driven is open for 
debate, the reality of these occupations was the destabilization of the agricultural sector. Thus, 
despite economically promising production, either the Zimbabwean state saw their “fast track” 
land distribution as being expedient in achieving their ends, or land redistribution went off 
without one driving agent or class (Bernstein, 2003). In either case, the result was a dramatic 
decrease in harvests and yields, a flight away from domestic food sovereignty, and a serious 
threat to Zimbabwean food security. 
Unequal Land Distribution 
 
 If we are to blame the solution, land redistribution, we must also point a finger at the 
problem land reform sought to resolve: the historical inequality of land distribution in 
Zimbabwe. Inequality in land holdings is what created the political situation that made land 
reapportionment feasible. In addition to contributing to that political climate, the inequality of 
land holdings prior to land redistribution may have doomed the Zimbabwean small farmer a life 
of unprofitability.  
 Only a small portion of the arable land in Zimbabwe is cultivated, creating a problem for 
large farms that would seek to employ workers at low wages – disenfranchised workers could 
simply move on to an unoccupied parcel of land and engage in subsistence farming. Deininger 
and Binswanger (1995) argued that the landed elites used their political capital to create a 
condition that would make small-holder farms economically unfeasible, even if the land was 
available. A per-capita tax was imposed on all farmers, forcing subsistence farmers to bring at 
least a portion of their crop to market. Additionally, small holders were restricted to land 
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reserves, and “as of 1915, almost all of the reserves were located more than 25 miles from 
railway” (Deininger and Binswanger, 1995 pp. 503) in an effort to ensure they would not be able 
to have sufficient access to the market so as to make cultivation profitable, and to  prevent their 
threatening larger industrial farms. Finally, cash crops were tightly controlled, with the 
Zimbabwean state dictating what could and could not be brought to market (Deininger and 
Binswanger, 1995 pp. 496). These taxes and market interventions tailored the Zimbabwean 
agricultural sector to be small-farm unfriendly, and to discriminate against crops cultivated for 
the domestic market. 
 Finally, landed elites attempted to choke out domestic maize production specifically. In 
the 1930s, dual pricing was employed in order to subsidize imported maize and squash domestic 
production. In fact, white landholders had to “declare publicly that they never intended to teach 
the natives to grow maize in competition with European producers” (Deininger and Binswanger, 
1995 pp. 511). In Zimbabwe, in contrast to Zambia’s equation of maize and modernity, the 
cultivation and harvesting of maize had been actively discriminated against.  
Agricultural Inputs 
 In Zimbabwe the monopoly of the state in agricultural inputs, present during colonial 
rule, was largely left untouched through the early 1990s. “These monopolies confer structural 
advantages to the large farm sector, distort prices, and also drain government funds” (Deininger 
and Binswanger, 1995 pp. 516). These state-run input monopolies were mostly unsuccessful in 
supporting the agricultural sector, with less than 50% of farmers using fertilizers. When the state 
finally did relinquish control of agricultural inputs, it was by all accounts in an effort to reduce 
their drain on the budget, not to hand over the reins to a capable market. The Zimbabwean  
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Figure 2: From Zimbabwean Independence to GMO Acceptance 
 
 
 
government then shifted its attention on to its land reform policies, creating a political situation 
that ensured foreign input investment would not be forthcoming.  
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To begin with, the Zimbabwean government did not begin to form a program comparable to 
Zambia’s FSP until 1999, with help from the Citizens Network for Foreign Affairs (CNFA). 
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with claims rising “tenfold (from only one percent of credit in 2000-1) because of uncertainty 
surrounding Zimbabwe’s land reform program, and a virtual monopoly over input supply granted 
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agricultural sector by a drop in export earnings. “The land reform has resulted in a dramatic drop 
in food production and export earnings, which have induced food shortages and reduced the 
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famine. By the time of the famine, the depressed economic situation ensured that no input 
support program could be rolled out in time to be a viable solution to the food shortage.  
 International support for the Zimbabwean agricultural sector has also negatively affected 
that segment of the economy. A “critical effect of land reform is the serious deterioration of the 
Government’s relationship with some western countries and consecutive restrictions to foreign 
aid” (“Zimbabwe: Insight into the humanitarian crisis and food policies”).   This aid has been 
shifted away from the areas of resettlement, which were themselves chosen for being the most 
viable for crop cultivation. Aid has also been shifted away from the agricultural sector and on to 
either emergency food relief, as in the case of the WFP’s 2002 famine response, or less 
politically charged topics such as HIV/AIDS.  
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VI. Comparisons and Implications 
 
Comparing the GMO policies of Zambia and Zimbabwe is instructive in teasing out the 
variation between the two states with regards to GMO. Despite similar colonial and post-colonial 
contexts, the two states followed very different agricultural policies and maintained significantly 
different priorities through the post-independence era. A comparison of the two states of Zambia 
and Zimbabwe reveals a plausible hypothesis accounting for the variation in their GMO policies: 
Zambia’s persistent rejection is accounted for by the presence of a well-organized agricultural 
input subsidy program, and the fact that the WFP’s grain donation program ran counter to the 
food security program Zambia had envisioned for itself.   
Zimbabwe’s earlier efforts to hamstring the small-holder farm market set in motion a series 
of events that ensured it would not have the kind of agricultural infrastructure necessary to resist 
accepting GMO inputs in 2002. The heavy handedness of the policies enacted by the landed 
elites made the sustainability of the situation impossible. When independence came, then, the 
revolutionary focus was on rectifying the inequality in land holdings, not unraveling the policies 
put forth by the colonial powers or restructuring the agricultural sector. As such, effects from the 
discrimination against small-holder farmers persisted, and no subsidy structure was put in place 
to support them. Without access to credit or inputs, the agricultural sector was in no position to 
support the sweeping land reforms under the Mugabe regime when they came. 
Whereas Zambia had in place a well-organized infrastructure for supplying rural farmers 
with agricultural input credit and output marketing, Zimbabwe’s land reform program had 
created too unstable of a situation, politically and economically, for any such program to have 
been successful. They had prioritized land reform and resettlement ahead of agricultural 
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production or input subsidization. This decision reflected the longstanding focus on land holding 
equitability that existed before, and was one of the contributing factors to, the Zimbabwean war 
for independence. Zimbabwe had relinquished much of the progress they had made towards food 
sovereignty in the 1990s in favor of their land resettlement programs. This created the situation 
in 2002 where, without a domestic solution to their food shortages, Zimbabwe had little choice 
but to accept the WFP’s milled GMO maize. The necessary technical and financial support of 
farmers was wholly lacking in Zimbabwe, owing in no small part to the perceived instability 
caused by the land reform programs in the eyes of the international community.  
Zambia was in a position to reject the WFP donated grain in 2002 in large part because its 
earlier policies had given it a feasible alternative in an increase in foreign and domestic 
agricultural subsidies; For Zambia, however costly the famine and subsequent food shortage 
might be the issue was a temporary one. In Zimbabwe, however, there was no end in sight as 
foreign subsidies would not be forthcoming and the state had neither the infrastructure nor the 
resources to support the agricultural sector. In the years before the famine, who owned the land 
in Zimbabwe had proven more politically and culturally important than how productive that land 
was. Zimbabwe rejected unmilled grain, perhaps in an effort to maintain a unified front with its 
Southern African neighbors but, along with Mozambique and Malawi, was unable to join 
Zambia in rejecting milled grain. 
The uniform initial-rejection of the Southern African states would seem to indicate that they 
all had real reservations against accepting GMO grain. The acceptance of the donated grain by 
Zimbabwe, Mozambique, and Malawi, was likely therefore not an acceptance of the technology 
as a safe and efficacious solution to their food shortage issues. In fact, the issue of GMO has 
remained a contested one in those three states in the decade following the 2002 famine. It would  
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Figure 3 
Variation in Agricultural Subsidization and Land Reform Programs in Zimbabwe and Zambia 
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seem, instead, that the three acquiescing states were merely the three states that could least afford 
to turn down free grain during a famine. Foisting a technology on a state in desperate need of 
famine relief is not likely to bode well for the future of the technology. If steps are to be made to 
convince Southern African states of the biotechnological solutions to their food shortage issues, 
they must be made on those states’ terms.  
 Broadly, the case studies of Zambia and Zimbabwe during the 2002 famine provide some 
contrasts that are portable to other parts of the developing world and other bodies of literature. In 
the Zimbabwean case study, we find the vast and varied repercussions of land resettlement 
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policies. In comparing Zambia to Zimbabwe, we see how a culturally significant crop can shape 
policy over a period of decades. We further find the case of Zambia to be instructive when 
examining how GMO rejection hampers, or doesn’t hamper, a state’s agricultural production in 
the 21
st
 century.  
 In terms of Zimbabwe’s land reform and resettlement policies, the damage caused to the 
economy by their inaction is likely larger in scope and scale than the existing literature on the 
topic would give it credit (or blame) for. Economies recover and, in generations, human rights 
abuses may even be forgotten, but the creation of a situation where a new technology is forced 
on a population is not likely to have only short-term implications. For better or worse, 
biotechnology and genetic modification are technologies that are going to become an 
increasingly important part of daily life. It is impossible to foresee the long term effects of a new 
technology being foisted on a famine-stricken population. The land reform and resettlement 
policies may have sealed Zimbabwe’s fate with regards to achieving food security, much less 
sovereignty, and poisoned the biotechnology well in that region for generations to come.  
 The Zambia and Zimbabwe case studies also illustrate the salience of the cultural 
significance of a crop. Zambia chose to face a famine without foreign assistance rather than 
either accepting donated wheat or threatening their domestic maize economy. These kinds of 
priorities by donor states must be taken in to account prior to the formation of emergency relief 
policy. There is no “Southern Africa” that can be treated with a one-size-fits-all famine relief 
package. While many Southern African states share a common colonial and even post-colonial 
legacy, they each have been shaped by unique aspects of their history that, from afar, may seem 
insignificant. The implications of the Zambian copper boom wouldn’t appear to include 21st 
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century biotechnology policy, and yet they do. A proper understanding of local conditions should 
render uniform solutions to regional issues that cut across state lines few and far between.  
 From the perspective of a GMO opponent, Zambia should stand as a clear example of 
traditional agricultural practices and input support carrying the day. While it would not be 
reasonable to argue that the continuing issues faced by Zimbabwe have been caused or even 
impacted by the acceptance of the GMO grain, the successes in Zambia and strides towards food 
security have occurred in spite of their GMO rejection. If Zambia has suffered for its rejection of 
GMO, its comparison with Zimbabwe does not show it.  
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VII. Conclusions 
 
Whether or not genetically modified organisms are the solution to Southern Africa’s food 
supply issues is a question that is not undertaken or addressed in this paper. There exists in the 
social and physical science literature much debate as to the efficacy of GMO. Further, authors 
such as Vandana Shiva have called in to question the sustainability of increasing yields through 
genetic modification and the socioeconomic costs of increasing productivity in regions where 
employment is an equally scarce resource (Shiva, 99). Whether or not GMO presents a viable 
food security and sovereignty solution, an understanding of the reasons behind GMO rejection is 
important and useful for the crafting of future food relief programs.  
It is one thing to point out the flaws in the WFP’s 2002 approach to the Southern African 
famine, and quite another to present an alternative that might have met with more success. 
Clearly, as indicated by the outright rejection by Zambia and the eventual acceptance by 
Zimbabwe, Malawi and Mozambique, treating all of Southern Africa with the same grain-
donation bandage was not the proper approach. While this paper has focused mostly on Zambia’s 
persistent rejection of GMO, and the reasons behind the same, a similar comparative study 
before 2002 of any two of the other states might also have found reasons to be skeptical of the 
WFP’s uniform treatment. In general, a treatment of the Southern African food crisis with a 
generic “throw food at the problem” solution seems to be the major shortcoming of the WFP’s 
approach. Consequently, an understanding and acknowledgment of what steps each individual 
recipient country has already undertaken to mitigate the food security issue would go a long way 
towards ensuring future programs meet with more success.  
My intention in writing this paper has been to use a comparison of two states with similar 
histories and economies, but different policies regarding GMO during the 2002 famine, to 
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generate a hypothesis as to what conditions are predictive of GMO-rejection. The chief aim was 
not to ascertain what would lead to acceptance, but to draw a clear line around one set of 
circumstances that did lead to rejection, and attempt to tease out what the mitigating factors 
were. It is not possible to point to one difference between Zambia and Zimbabwe and declare 
that the causal factor; rather, there are a series of differences in their economic histories and 
cultures that lead each to make the decisions they made in the midst of the famine.  
The chief finding of this paper has been that differing conceptions of modernity placed 
contrasting pressures on Zambia and Zimbabwe’s agricultural sectors. Specific historical 
circumstances, namely urbanization and the subsequent collapse of the copper industry, caused 
the Zambian state to put an emphasis on maize cultivation, from their colonial era through 
independence to the present. Zimbabwe placed more emphasis on who owned the land that was 
being cultivated, rather than the productivity of the agricultural sector. Consequently, Zimbabwe 
undertook sweeping land reform policies that hampered the agricultural sector generally and 
maize cultivation specifically. When the 2002 famine struck Zambia and Zimbabwe, Zambia had 
a robust agricultural input subsidy program that was tasked with improving yields. Zimbabwe 
had only a nascent input program, and had no choice but to accept the WFP’s offer of GMO 
grain. This is explanatory when examining the two cases of Zambia and Zimbabwe, but cannot 
be expanded to other cases without further study.  
Limitations to Generalizability  
 The two comparative cases of Zambia and Zimbabwe are instructive in examining the 
specific research question undertaken in this paper: namely, what were the reasons and 
motivations for the persistent rejection of donated GMO grain in Zambia. The case studies 
contained in this paper do succeed in teasing out these reasons for this specific case, but can be 
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generalized only with further analyses of further cases. There are a few reasons caution should be 
used in attempting to apply this analysis to other developing countries. First, the cases may 
themselves contain unique factors that would confound any application to other cases. Second, 
the Southern African export market, namely other African states and the European Union, may 
explain some of the policy positions taken up by the two states.  
 The two cases each possess histories marked by anomalous periods and policies. In the 
case of Zambia, there are few states in the developing world that have endured the boom and 
bust cycle that was the Zambian Copper Boom of the mid-20
th
 century. It is possible that the 
experience of rapid urbanization and equally rapid urban collapse gave rise to the cultural 
significance of maize on a scale that is simply not present anywhere else in the developing 
world. If the cultural significance of maize caused the persistent rejection of GMO in Zambia, as 
this paper contends, it is not known what other sequence of events could have caused the same 
level of significance in another state. It is therefore not possible to apply the cases studied in this 
paper to other states merely because they also have a culturally significant crop. For instance, 
rice is an extremely significant crop in Japan, and yet genetically modified strains, developed 
domestically and abroad, are cultivated and integrated in to the food supply. The differing 
conceptions of rice in Japan and maize in Zambia may be an interesting avenue for future 
research. 
 Additionally, while land reform is certainly not unique to Zimbabwe, the land 
resettlement practices that have marked the last two decades of Zimbabwean history are unique 
in the developing world. The scope and scale of land reapportionment may be more explanatory 
in considering Zimbabwe’s acquiescence than this paper gives it credit for. The acquiescence of 
Malawi and Mozambique, in addition to Zimbabwe, would suggest that the land resettlement 
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program doesn’t have a causal relationship with GMO grain acceptance, but cannot exclude its 
importance. Future use of this study should take care to ensure the specific manner in which the 
Zimbabwean agricultural sector was disrupted by land resettlement does not render the case 
study wholly ungeneralizable.  
 Finally, care must be taken to control for export markets when putting these case studies 
to use. The sort of vacillation in GMO policy found in Southern Africa is not present in 
developing South American agricultural states, which may in part be due to those states’ chief 
export partner, the United States, having very permissive GMO policies. While a direct causal 
link between export market preservation and GMO policy has been excluded in this paper, that is 
not to say that the GMO position of the EU and its member states does not exert some influence 
over the policies of Southern Africa. As mentioned in section II, the crops for which GMO 
strains have been promoted are not those that the Southern African states export to the EU. 
However, one can imagine a scenario in which the Southern African governments are crafting 
policy with an eye towards Europe, so to speak, while the South American governments are 
doing the same with the United States.  
Broad Lessons 
  
While considering the aforementioned reasons to employ caution in generalizing the findings 
contained in this paper, there are not necessarily specific “lessons” that can be directly cut and 
pasted on to other cases. There are, however, broad observations and suggestions that the 
analysis might suggest in dealing with similar situations in the developing world.  There are three 
broad steps that might be taken to help design future programs in a way that is acceptable to 
recipient and donor country alike.  
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First, cultural information regarding the significance of individual crops must be made 
available and known to policymakers and NGOs. In famine and emergency relief services at the 
transnational level, there seems to be a feeling of beggars not being choosers. While it does not 
seem to be the case that the west, through the WFP, was “dumping” excess grain on Southern 
Africa (as some have contended), there does not appear to have been sufficient thought put in to 
the individual cultural and socioeconomic conditions of the recipient states. Either this 
knowledge was not available, or was simply not taken in to account when the WFP relief 
program was put in place. In either case, the information must be made available if the 
policymakers are to be taken to task for ignoring it.  
Second, and more broadly, reservations towards new technologies in the developing world 
should not simply be assumed to stem from a lack of knowledge. Millions of dollars are spent for 
education campaigns to assure citizens of the developing world that new technologies are safe 
and efficacious. These funds would be better spent helping to integrate the new technologies in 
to the existing cultural and social frameworks in place in those states. If maize is a culturally 
significant crop to be cultivated in Zambia, efforts should be made to tailor relief efforts in a way 
that is considerate towards that position. Relief efforts can be targeted towards helping to support 
efforts already undertaken by the state. In the case of Zambia, agricultural inputs such as hybrid 
seeds and fertilizer can be contributed at the state or local level in a relief situation. These 
solutions are not as rapidly deployable as donated grain, but agricultural input support that 
bolsters the following season’s crop cycle is of more use to a starving population than GMO 
grain that is destroyed or returned to the donor states.  
Third, an effort must be made to move away from single-causal theories with regards to 
technology adoption or rejection in the developing world. The reality of the situation in Southern 
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Africa is that a confluence of factors made accepting the WFP’s donated grain a less-than-ideal 
situation for all of the recipient states. The acquiescing states, in worse straits than Zambia, had 
no choice but to accept the grain donations -- but their acceptance of the donated grain should 
not be conflated with their acceptance of the technology. The recipient states have a number of 
reasons to be skeptical of GMO technology, not the least of which is a concern about becoming 
reliant on western firms for seeds and tailored pesticides. Imagining their reluctance as stemming 
from a single causal issue belies the truth of the matter, and makes single-issue solutions a 
reasonable response to their rejection. The recipient states likely did not have sufficient 
information to make an informed decision as to the safety of the donated grain, but they also 
would be wise to consider the effect of the presence of GMO on their European Union market, 
over the long term. The long term sustainability of solutions to issues in the developing world 
must be considered from the perspective of the states that are to be assisted.  
In the years since the 2002 famine, the production levels in Zambia and Zimbabwe have 
diverged dramatically. Zambia has continued to see growth in its agricultural sector generally, 
and its maize production specifically. Zimbabwe has continued to suffer from food shortages and 
an underperforming agricultural sector. While drawing a causal link between these outcomes and 
the acceptance or rejection of GMO grain in 2002 is probably a long shot, and definitely a matter 
for another study, it is safe to say that something in Zambia’s approach is working. Potential 
avenues for future research may include a comparative study of several input subsidy programs 
across Southern Africa, and an examination of the role of foreign investment in those programs. 
An understanding of how foreign investment, or even direct input subsidization, would have 
been used most effectively during the 2002 famine will be instructive in designing responses to 
future famines in the region.  
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